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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Late last summer, Governor Lynch signed into law Senate Bill 465, 
designed to further update New Hampshire‘s trust law.1  This bill follows 
  
 * This title was inspired by (or stolen from) William L. Cary, who described jurisdictional compe-
tition in corporate law as a ―race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead.‖  William L. Cary, Federal-
ism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974). 
 ** J.D., magna cum laude, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2009); M.B.A., Saint Mary‘s College of 
California (1995); B.S., Economics, St. Bonaventure University (1979).  The author would like to 
thank Jeffrey Rummler and Jason Dorsky for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. S.B. 465, 2008 Sess. (N.H. 2008), available at 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2008/SB0465.html.  
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similar legislation in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and several other states.
2
  
It adds major new provisions to the existing statutory framework for irre-
vocable trusts.
3
  The bill allows for the creation of so-called self-settled 
asset protection trusts or domestic asset protection trusts (DAPTs).
4
  
DAPTs represent the latest chapter in our State‘s move away from tradi-
tional trust and estate principles towards a system of dynastic and (theoret-
ically) creditor-proof trusts. 
This legislation results from New Hampshire‘s desire to retain and at-
tract trust activity.
5
  Effective January 2, 2009, the new Qualified Disposi-
tions in Trust Act
6
 allows beneficiaries to ―self settle‖ irrevocable spend-
thrift trusts—for example, put assets into trust for their own benefit, while 
placing those assets, in many circumstances, out of the reach of most credi-
tors.
7
  This article will attempt to answer some questions about these trusts.  
Will RSA 564–D succeed in increasing New Hampshire‘s share of the 
domestic trust business?  Will these new trusts prove to be effective against 
creditors?  Finally, what are the policy implications of these new trusts? 
II.  TRUST REFORM 
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities 
Until 1984, most United States jurisdictions recognized a version of 
the common law rules against the remoteness of vesting or against the sus-
pension of the power of alienation.
8
  These common law restrictions are 
usually referred to as the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP).
9
  Prior to 1986, 
the three states that had abolished the RAP ―experienced little or no result-
  
2. New Hampshire Enacts Domestic Asset Protection Trust and Related Legislation , 
MCGUIREWOODS.COM, July 7, 2008, http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-
resources/news/3383.asp?SearchFor=Domestic%20Asset%20Protection%20Trust .  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5. See N.H. S.B. 465.  The bill, as enacted, states:  
This act will serve to continue New Hampshire‘s firm commitment to be the best and most 
attractive legal environment in the nation for trusts and fiduciary services, an environment 
that will continue to attract to our state good-paying jobs for trust and investment manage-
ment, legal and accounting professionals, and other professionals to provide the support and 
infrastructure required to service this growing sector of the nation‘s economy. 
Id. 
 6.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D (2008). 
 7.  Id. § 564-D:10. 
 8. See GEORGE T. BOGERT ET AL., TRUSTS 184–92 (1987).  
 9. Id. at 188.  (In many jurisdictions in the U.S., the traditional common law RAP, a life in being 
plus twenty-one years, has been modified for practical reasons.  In the mid-1980s, the drafters of the 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities adopted a ninety-year ―wait and see‖ version of the com-
mon law RAP.)  Id. 
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ing advantage in the jurisdictional competition for trust funds.‖10  The gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax exemptions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986
11
 
provided ―significant‖ tax benefits to trusts in states that had abolished the 
RAP to ―continue, free from federal wealth transfer taxation, generation 
after generation, forever.‖12  By the end of 2004, twenty states had signifi-
cantly weakened or abolished the RAP as applied to interests in trusts.
13
  
Since then, several states, including New Hampshire, have enacted trust 
laws enabling transferors to take advantage of the new tax regime, effec-
tively eliminating the RAP.
14
 
Whether the weakening or elimination of the RAP as a result of the tax 
benefits of modified trust law is good public policy is beyond the scope of 
this essay and is the subject of active debate amongst commentators and 
practitioners.
15
  However, in the years following the 1986 Act, empirical 
analysis revealed a dramatic increase in reported trust assets for those 
states that abolished the RAP,
16
 and others postulate that ―trust funds flow 
to states with more favorable laws and lower taxes.  States that do not pro-
vide such benefits will lose trust business.‖17  Also, commentators have 
written extensively on the impact of jurisdictional competition in promot-




 10. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: an 
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 373 (2005) [hereinafter Jurisdiction-
al Competition].  The three states were Idaho, South Dakota and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 11. 26 U.S.C. §§ 26012663 (1986). 
 12. Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 10, at 371 n.42. 
 13. Id. at 359; see Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpe-
tual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511, 2511–18 (2006). 
 14. Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 10, at 376.  The authors state:  
The Delaware statute triggered a race to abolish the Rule.  Between 1997 and 2000, Alaska, 
Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island authorized perpe-
tual trusts.  By late 2005, Colorado, Florida (360 years), Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada (365 
years), New Hampshire, Utah (1000 years), Virginia, and Wyoming (1000 years) had fol-
lowed suit.  Legislation designed to abolish the [RAP] is under consideration in several oth-
er states. 
Id. 
 15. Lynn Foster, Fifty-One Flowers, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV 411, 41537 (2007). 
 16. Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 10, at 359 (concluding that over $100 billion in trust 
assets had moved to take advantage of new trust laws). 
 17. Robert M. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Perpetuities, Taxes, and Asset Protection: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds, in HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, paper 609, ¶ 
1212.2, at 12-30 (2008) [hereinafter Perpetuities, Taxes, and Asset Protection], available at  
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=harvard/olin. 
 18. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1035, 1038–39 (2000) (―In recent decades, legal scholars have moved beyond corporate law to 
evaluate the effect of interjurisdictional competition in other areas of law, including banking law, [and] 
environmental law . . . .‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
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B. Spendthrift Trusts 
Most states recognize the validity of ―spendthrift‖ provisions in trusts, 
allowing the transferor to protect the trust assets from the beneficiaries‘ 
potential creditors.
19
  It was universally accepted, however, that a spend-
thrift provision would not protect a transferor‘s assets from creditors by 
placing them in a trust where he or she was also the beneficiary (so-called 
self-settled trusts).
20
  Recent caselaw illustrates this notion: while ―a spend-
thrift provision prohibiting involuntary transfers is valid and enforceable, 
[a] spendthrift provision prohibiting involuntary transfers is not valid if the 
beneficiary is the settlor.‖21 
Similarly, under traditional law, a settlor could not avoid creditors by 
creating a discretionary trust.
22
  A discretionary trust is one in which the 
trust documents give the trustee discretion to pay income or principal to the 
beneficiary, or pay nothing.
23
  Generally, absent fraud, the principal and 
income of a discretionary trust are out of the reach of creditors on the 
theory that the beneficiary has no interest in the trust property unless and 
until the trustee, in his sole discretion, distributes it to the beneficiary.
24
  
However, the traditional rule is if the discretionary trust beneficiary is also 
the settlor, the creditor can ―reach the maximum amount the trustee, in the 
proper exercise of fiduciary discretion, could pay for the benefit of the 
settlor.‖25 
  
 19. A trust‘s ―spendthrift‖ provision provides that the beneficiary is unable to transfer a right to 
future payments of income or principal, effectively preventing creditors from claiming trust assets or 
income not distributed in settlement of claims.  See RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(1) (2003) 
(―[T]he terms of a trust provide that a beneficial interest shall not be transferable by the beneficiary or 
subject to claims of the beneficiary‘s creditors, the restraint on voluntary and involuntary alienation of 
the interest is valid.‖).  But see Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R.I. 205, 212 (1858) (―Certainly, no man 
should have an estate to live on, but not an estate to pay his debts with.  Certainly, property available 
for the purposes of pleasure or profit, should be also amenable to the demands of justice.‖  (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959) (―Where a person creates for his own 
benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his 
transferee or creditors can reach his interest.‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (2003) (―A 
restraint on the voluntary and involuntary alienation of a beneficial interest retained by the settlor of a 
trust is invalid.‖). 
 21. Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. 1993) (internal citation omitted); accord Vanderbilt 
Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 100 A.D.2d 544, 54546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 22. See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959) (―Where a person creates for his own 
benefit a trust for support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum 
amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit.‖). 
 23. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 8, at 160. 
 24. Id. 
 25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (2003). 
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1. Offshore Trusts 
In an effort to attract U.S. domestic trust administration business, a 
number of foreign jurisdictions developed trust laws eliminating the tradi-
tional creditor protection rule in self-settled spendthrift and discretionary 
trusts.
26
  Professor Sterk describes why the Cook Islands is a favorite site 
for trust assets: 
Consider the Cook Islands‘ International Trusts Act of 1984.  By 
its terms, the statute applies only to international trusts, not to 
trusts established for the benefit of residents of the Cook Islands—
a sure sign that the purpose of the statute was to attract foreign 
capital.  To that end, the statute includes numerous measures that 
make the Cook Islands a favorite trust situs for settlors seeking to 
avoid creditor claims.  First, the statute makes self-settled spend-
thrift trusts fully enforceable.  Second, the statute provides that 
creditors may not reach a settlor‘s interest in an international trust 
even if the settlor retains a right to revoke the trust.  As a result, 
once a settlor‘s assets enter a Cook Islands international trust, the 
settlor‘s creditors may not attach the settlor-beneficiary‘s interest.  
Third, although the law of the Cook Islands was founded on Eng-
lish law, including the Statute of Elizabeth‘s prohibition on fraudu-
lent transfers, the statute now virtually precludes creditors from 
attacking a transfer into a Cook Islands international trust as a 
fraudulent conveyance.  Under the statute, even if a creditor proves 
that the settlor intended to defraud by transferring assets into a 
trust, the creditor may not reach the trust assets unless the settlor 
was insolvent at the time the creditor‘s claim arose.  Moreover, 
even in the rare case in which a transfer to an international trust is 
deemed fraudulent, the Cook Islands statute imposes a short statute 
of limitations on creditor claims: the creditor must bring the action 
within one year from the date of the fraudulent transfer.  As a re-
sult, if the settlor of a Cook Islands trust is solvent when she trans-
fers assets into the trust, the transfers will not, under Cook Islands 
law, be voidable at the behest of creditors.  Finally, the statute ex-
pressly provides that no Cook Islands court shall enforce or recog-
  
 26. For a discussion of the evolution of foreign trusts from primarily tax avoidance or tax evasion 
devices into mechanisms to capture assets from settlors wishing to avoid liability from potential credi-
tors, see Sterk, supra note 18, at 1048–50.  As an example of offshore trusts, Professor Sterk also 
describes the anti-creditor construction of the trust statutes in the Cook Islands, where the creditor‘s 
claims are extinguished, even in some cases, where the creditor can prove, in a Cook Islands court, that 
the settlor intended to defraud the creditor.  Id.  Courts in the Cook Islands will generally not honor 
judgments obtained in foreign jurisdictions—including the United States.  Id. 
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nize a foreign judgment against a Cook Islands trust, or a settlor, 
trustee, or beneficiary of the trust, if the judgment is based upon 
application of a law inconsistent with the statute.
27
 
Other foreign jurisdictions have similar creditor-protective trust re-
gimes.
28
  States began to recognize that as much as a trillion dollars of U.S. 
citizens‘ assets now reside in foreign trusts.29  As some states modified 
trust rules regarding the RAP, many of those same states have modified or 
eliminated the long-standing rules against creditor protection in self-settled 
spendthrift and discretionary trusts.
30
 
2. Domestic Asset Protection Trusts 
In the early 1990s a New York trust attorney, on a fishing trip in 
Alaska with his brother and a friend, an Alaskan attorney, conceived of the 
idea of reforming Alaska‘s statutory trust framework to provide for a do-
mestic version of the offshore self-settled asset protection trust as a means 
to attract trust business to the state.
31
  They were successful in implement-
ing their idea.
32
  They drafted and contributed to the passage of the Alaska 
Trust Act in 1997 allowing DAPTs.
33
  The partners then formed the Alaska 
Trust Company to take advantage of the anticipated influx of trust busi-
ness.
34
  Shortly thereafter, Delaware entered the mix and passed similar 
legislation, intending to compete with Alaska and ―to maintain Delaware‘s 
role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of 
trusts.‖35  Since then, at least seven more jurisdictions (now including New 




 27. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 28. See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23 EST. 
PLAN. 65, 71 (1996).  The author claims that, at the time of writing, at least thirteen jurisdictions pro-
vide for self-settled asset protection trusts, including the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cay-
man Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Mauritius, Turks and Caicos, Nevis, and Neue.  Id. at 71 
n.1. 
 29. See Sterk, supra note 18, at 1050–51. 
 30. Robert Sitkoff, The Rap on RAP, HARVARD LAW BULLETIN (Winter 2008), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2008/winter/ask.php (―Nearly half the states have repealed 
or modified the [RAP] to allow for perpetual trusts. And, 10 states have validated the so-called self-
settled asset protection trust . . .‖ including Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming). 
 31. For a description of the genesis of the Alaska Trust Company, see About Us, ALASKA TRUST 
CO., http://www.alaskatrust.com/index.php?id=32 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 10, at 382 (quoting H.R. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 
Del. Laws 159 (1997)). 
 36. Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2686–87 
(2006). 
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III.  NEW HAMPSHIRE ENTERS THE FRAY 
New Hampshire‘s new Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, which au-
thorizes DAPTs, has several general requirements for a self-settled trust to 







3) have all or part of the trust corpus located in New Hampshire;
39
 
4) incorporate New Hampshire state law;
40
 
5) contain a ―spendthrift‖ provision;41 and 
6) appoint a ―qualified trustee‖ e.g., a New Hampshire resident, or a 
state or federally chartered bank or trust company that has a place 
of business in New Hampshire and maintains records in the state.
42
 
If the above criteria are properly met, creditors may have a difficult 
time recovering against a DAPT.  For instance, the statute provides: 
no action of any kind, including an action to enforce a judgment 
entered by a court or other body having adjudicative authority, 
may be brought at law or in equity for an attachment or other pro-
visional remedy against property that is the subject of a qualified 
disposition or for avoidance of a qualified disposition unless such 
action is brought pursuant to the provisions of RSA 545–A, the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, or RSA 564–D:15.43 
The statutory exceptions, RSA 545–A (UFTA) and RSA 546–D:15, do 
not offer post-disposition creditors much comfort.  Absent proof of a void 
disposition pursuant to the UFTA (more on this below), any claims that 
arise against the settlor after a qualified disposition are extinguished unless 
(1) the settler is found to be liable in tort for damages occurring prior to the 
disposition, or (2) the settlor has liability for spousal support if the settlor 




 37. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D:2(I)(b) (2008). 
 38. Id. § 564-D:8. 
 39. Id. § 564-D:3. 
 40. Id. § 564-D:2(I)(a). 
 41. Id. § 564-D:2(I)(c). 
 42. Id. § 564-D:3. 
 43. Id. § 564-D:9. 
 44. Id. § 564-D:15(I).  The statute states:  
I.  Notwithstanding the provisions of RSA 564-D:9 to RSA 564-D:14, inclusive, this chapter 
does not apply in any respect:  
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RSA 564–D:10 provides that all creditors‘ claims are extinguished un-
less: 
I. The creditor‘s claim arose before the qualified disposition was 
made and the action is brought within the limitations period of 
RSA 545–A, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, that was in ef-
fect on the date of the qualified disposition; or 
II. Notwithstanding the provisions of RSA 545–A, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, the creditor‘s claim arose on or after the 
date of the qualified disposition, and the action is brought within 




Here, a ―claim‖ has a broad meaning: it includes ―a right to payment, 
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equita-
ble, secured, or unsecured.‖46 
RSA 564–D:10 thus incorporates the New Hampshire UFTA statutes 
of limitation—regarding when a creditor‘s claim is extinguished—of either 
one year or four years.
47
  Generally, after four years (or less) from the date 
of disposition, a creditor‘s claims are extinguished, regardless of the trans-
feror‘s intent.48 
RSA 564–D, while technically irrevocable and discretionary, does 
provide the transferor means for significant control over the activities of 
the trust, and trustee.  For instance, the trust will not lose its irrevocability 
even if the transferor retains the right (among others): 
1) to veto distributions;
49
 




(a) To any person to whom the transferor is indebted on account of an antenuptial 
agreement or an agreement or order of court for the payment of support or alimony in 
favor of such transferor‘s spouse, former spouse, or children, or for a division or dis-
tribution of property in favor of such transferor‘s spouse or former spouse, but only to 
the extent of such debt; or 
(b) To any person who suffers death, personal injury, or property damage on or before 
the date of a qualified disposition by a transferor, which death, personal injury, or 
property damage is at any time determined to have been caused in whole or in part by 
the act or omission of either such transferor or by another person for whom such trans-
feror is or was vicariously liable. 
Id. 
 45. Id. § 564-D:10. 
 46. Id. § 564-D:1(I). 
 47. See id. § 545-A (2008). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(a).  
 50. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(b). 
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3) to receive trust-specified actual or potential income;
51
 




5) to actually or potentially receive trust principal;
53
 
6) to remove and appoint a trustee or trust advisors;
54
 and 
7) to use real property held in a personal residence trust.
55
 
Perhaps most significant is the transferor‘s right to appoint and replace 
trust advisors and trustees.  Under the statute, a trust advisor has authority 
(if provided for in the trust instrument) to ―direct, consent to, or disapprove 
distribution from the trust.‖56  While technically the transferor has relin-
quished control and dominion over the assets in the trust, the power to ap-
point trust advisors who in turn have the power to direct or disapprove of 
distributions to the transferor, in practice and effect confers great authority 
and control over the trust assets.
57
  Unlike the trustee, the trust advisor need 
not be a New Hampshire resident.
58
 
IV.  WILL DAPTS ―WORK‖? 
As the reader can conclude, a New Hampshire DAPT may be an attrac-
tive vehicle for asset protection, particularly in light of some of the ex-
pense and perceived risks associated with its offshore cousins.
59
  But will 
the new DAPTs ―work?‖  That is, will they be effective in attracting trust 
business to the state?  And will the purported credit protection characteris-
tics actually prove effective—especially against judgments obtained in 
non-DAPT states?  What about the policy considerations of New Hamp-
shire‘s abandonment of the traditional rule against self-settled asset protec-
tion trusts?  Will the new DAPT statute lead to unintended consequences 
such as encouraging risky behavior by enabling wealthy transferors to be-
come judgment proof? 
  
 51. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(c). 
 52. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D:2(II)(e) (2008). 
 53. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(f). 
 54. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(g). 
 55. Id. § 564-D:2(II)(h). 
 56. Id. § 564-D:4(II). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1–103(27) (2008). 
 59. For a more comprehensive description of offshore self-settled trusts, including their benefits and 
risks, see Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP., 
PROB. & TR. J. 287, 303 (2002); see also J. Richard Duke, Offshore Trusts: Crossing the “T”s, 144 TR. 
& EST. 49 (2005). 
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A. Attracting “New” Trust Business 
It is very likely that we will never know if the New Hampshire DAPT, 
by itself, is successful in markedly increasing (or reducing the decrease of) 
trust activity in New Hampshire.  So far, the empirical evidence from other 
states is scant.  To date, the few states that have enacted DAPT statutes 
have also enabled dynastic trusts by eliminating the RAP.
60
  This compli-
cates the analysis because, in these states, it is difficult to know whether a 
change in trust activity is due to the DAPT statute or the elimination of the 
RAP.  Also, the dynamics of the movement of trust assets to states that 
have only eliminated the RAP (i.e., no DAPT statute) is probably different 
than it is to states that have both because these trust vehicles serve two 
different purposes.  The elimination of RAP presumably attracted new trust 
business from other states due to generation skipping and other tax advan-
tages.  Although DAPTs may also have tax and other advantages, DAPT 
statutes are designed to attract trust assets primarily for creditor protec-
tion—assets that would otherwise flow overseas.61 
Also, competition with other jurisdictions will likely limit the amount 
of trust activity RSA 564–D brings to New Hampshire.  New Hampshire is 
at least the ninth state to enable DAPTs, and it currently competes with 
several well-known trust destination states such as Delaware, Alaska, 
South Dakota, and Nevada.
62
  If these devices are perceived in non-DAPT 
states as successfully attracting trust business to New Hampshire, jurisdic-
tional competition is likely to further dilute any positive effect New Hamp-
shire‘s DAPTs have in attracting out-of-state business. 
It is currently unsettled as to how effective DAPTs will be in protect-
ing an out-of-state transferor‘s assets from out-of-state creditors.63  If, in 
out-of-state cases, DAPTs prove vulnerable, will New Hampshire‘s DAPT 
statute fail to attract out-of-state trust business and will these devices be 
primarily used only by New Hampshire‘s citizens? 
It is interesting to note that of the approximately nine states that have 
adopted DAPTs, most are states with small populations.  It is reasonable to 
assume that these states enabled DAPTs in an effort to attract new business 
from other, more populous non-DAPT states such as California, New 
York, Texas, and Florida.  It may be unlikely that a small state would 
  
 60. See Perpetuities, Taxes, and Asset Protection, supra note 17, at 12-812-10. 
 61. See generally Richard W. Nenno & John E. Sullivan, III, Planning and Defending Domestic 
Asset-Protection Trusts, in ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY: PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE 
ESTATES 797, 811–13 (2008). 
 62. Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Part I, 40 REAL PROP., 
PROB. & TR. J. 263, 271 (2005). 
 63. See infra Part IV.B. 
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adopt DAPT provisions if it believed that doing so would draw only in-
state trust business, effectively eliminating in-state creditors‘ rights.  Those 
in favor of DAPT legislation in New Hampshire may argue that, even if 
DAPTs prove somewhat vulnerable for out-of-state transferors, the addi-
tional hurdles out-of-state creditors must face in enforcing a judgment may 
discourage creditors, or at a minimum encourage speedy settlements.  In 
addition, DAPTs may be attractive to out-of-state transferors for gift and 
estate tax reasons as well as a substitute for antenuptial agreements.
64 
Obtaining meaningful empirical evidence will be difficult.  Because 
the New Hampshire statute became effective in January 2009, with the 
U.S. economic situation still unsettled, arguably a great deal of discretio-
nary assets that may have otherwise found their way into DAPTs (New 
Hampshire‘s included) either no longer exist or will be used for other pur-
poses.  It will be difficult to devise an empirical model that accurately 
measures the fiscal impact of RSA 564–D in light of difficult-to-control-
for exogenous economic variables. 
B. Asset Protection Effectiveness 
1. Non-DAPT States 
While the economic impact on the State is uncertain, so too are the as-
set-protection features of New Hampshire‘s DAPT.  To date, the author is 
unaware of any domestic appellate court that has enforced a judgment 
against a qualified disposition in a DAPT.  However, DAPTs are new de-
vices that have yet to be tested.  Several commentators have written about 
the ―durability‖ of the asset protection features of DAPTs, speculating that, 
for public policy reasons, courts in non-DAPT states may ignore the choice 
of law provisions in out-of-state DAPTs.
65
 
Imagine the hypothetical case of a Connecticut physician.  She proper-
ly establishes a New Hampshire DAPT, placing both personal and real 
property, including her primary Connecticut residence, in the trust.  She 
continues to live in her home, and collects annual distributions generated 
from the trust assets.  Five years later, she misdiagnoses a Connecticut 
patient, causing him serious harm.  The patient obtains a judgment against 
  
 64. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 65. Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 10, at 384 n.88.  The author states: 
Although there are not yet any definitive appellate decisions involving domestic APTs, there 
is a cautionary scholarly literature that explores bankruptcy law, fraudulent conveyance law, 
choice-of-law rules, federal constitutional considerations (such as the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause), and other doctrinal bases for refusing enforcement.  This literature also takes on the 
normative policy question. 
Id. 
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the physician.  Will the patient be able to enforce the judgment against the 
trust assets?  If the Connecticut courts respect the New Hampshire choice 
of law clause in the trust documents, under RSA 564–D, the answer is no.  
But the real question remains: will the Connecticut court apply New 
Hampshire law? 
―The ability of these trusts to truly protect a settlor‘s assets . . . may be 
uncertain.  One basis for this uncertainty lies in the potential for a conflict 
of laws.‖66  The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws states: 
The chief purpose in making decisions as to the applicable law is 
to carry out the intention of the creator of the trust in the disposal 
of his property.  It is important that his intention, to the extent to 
which it can be ascertained, should not be defeated, unless this is 
required by the policy of a state which has such an interest in de-
feating his intention, as to the particular issue involved, that its lo-
cal law should be applied.
67
 
Connecticut is a non-DAPT state.  As explained in In re Brooks, while 
―Connecticut courts generally respect the expressed will of the settlor [of a 
trust] as to the controlling law, [t]here are, however, exceptions.‖68  ―Con-
necticut will not . . . enforce the law of another jurisdiction nor the rights 
arising thereunder, which . . . contravene [Connecticut] public policy.‖69  
Furthermore, ―Connecticut courts have held that . . . the legality of the trust 
of personalty [is determined] by the law of the settlor‘s domicil [sic].‖70  
While the Brooks case concerned a federal bankruptcy court‘s application 
of Connecticut law regarding the assets in a self-settled offshore discretio-
nary trust, it seems likely that the Connecticut state court would reach the 
same conclusion in our hypothetical: that the New Hampshire DAPT is 
contrary to Connecticut public policy and Connecticut law applies regard-
less of the choice of law provision in the trust. 
A case from New York sheds additional light on our Connecticut hy-
pothetical.  In In re Portnoy, a debtor, Larry Portnoy, created an offshore 
self-settled spendthrift discretionary trust in the Jersey Channel Islands 
(Jersey).
71
  The New York Bankruptcy Court applied New York law in 
  
 66. Meaghan R. Hogan, Once More Unto the Breach: Planning for a Conflict of Laws with Alaska 
and Delaware Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 27, 28.  
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW ch. 10 (1971) (introductory note). 
 68. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (quoting Cantor v. Dep‘t of Income 
Maint., 531 A.2d 608, 610 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. (citing Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d 110, 117 (Conn. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. (quoting Stetson v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 164 A.2d 239, 240 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 698 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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spite of the Jersey choice of law provision in the trust document.
72
  The 
court denied Portnoy‘s claim for discharge under Chapter 7, concluding 
that the ―application of Jersey‘s substantive law would offend strong New 
York and federal bankruptcy policies if it were applied.‖73 
As both Brooks and Portnoy illustrate, regardless of the trust docu-
ment‘s choice of law provisions, attaching the Connecticut (or other non-
DAPT state) assets, particularly the real estate,
74
 may not pose a particular 
problem for a creditor.  But the next question is: will New Hampshire re-
spect the Connecticut court‘s judgment under Full Faith and Credit prin-
ciples if the debtor wishes to enforce the judgment against assets held in 
New Hampshire?  The answer is uncertain.
75
 
Connecticut is not alone.  Many states continue to embrace the tradi-
tional view, as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
76
 and the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
77
 that creditors can reach a debtor‘s self-
settled trust assets to the extent that a trustee could distribute assets to the 
debtor.
78
  Other states go even further.  In California, for instance, creditor 
restraints against irrevocable, self-settled, spendthrift trusts are invalid by 
statute.
79
  The California statute reads in part, ―If the settlor is a beneficiary 
of a trust created by the settlor and the settlor‘s interest is subject to a pro-
vision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the settlor‘s in-
terest, the restraint is invalid against transferees or creditors of the set-
tlor.‖80  Washington has a similar statute, stating ―[t]hat all deeds of gift, 
all conveyances, and all transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of 
  
 72. See id. (discussing how application of the Jersey law would offend New York and federal bank-
ing policies). 
 73. Id.; see also In re Cameron, 223 B.R. 20, 25 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).  The court in Cameron 
stated: 
[I]t is irrelevant that in creating the discretionary trust for her benefit the settlor did not in-
tend to defraud her creditors or was solvent at the time of the creation of the trust.  It is 
against public policy to permit the settlor beneficiary to tie up her own property in such a 
way that she can still enjoy it but prevent her creditors from reaching it. 
In re Cameron, 223 B.R. at 25 (quoting Vanderbilt Credit Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 100 
A.D.2d 544, 546  (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)). 
 74. Hogan, supra note 66, at 31 (―The rules surrounding the validity of a trust of real estate are 
simple.  In general, for disputes involving real property, the law of the situs state is the governing 
law.‖). 
 75. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958) (―Since Delaware was entitled to con-
clude that Florida law made the trust company an indispensable party, it was under no obligation to 
give the Florida judgment any faith and credit—even against parties over whom Florida‘s jurisdiction 
was unquestioned.‖). 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (2000). 
 78. Massachusetts is one example.  See, e.g., Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1954) 
(―The established policy of this Commonwealth long has been that a settlor cannot place property in 
trust for his own benefit and keep it beyond the reach of creditors.‖). 
 79. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15304(a) (West 1991). 
 80. Id. 
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goods, chattels or things in action, made in trust for the use of the person 
making the same, shall be void as against the existing or subsequent credi-
tors of such person.‖81  It appears very possible that courts in states with 
such laws would, as a matter of pubic policy, apply their own law and dis-
regard the debtor protection features of a New Hampshire DAPT. 
2. Federal Supremacy 
Principles of federal supremacy may also affect the validity of debtor 
protections in DAPTs, particularly in bankruptcy.
82
  In the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Congress in-
cluded a ten-year look back period to allow the bankruptcy estate to set 
aside fraudulent transfers made to a DAPT.
83
  The Portnoy court noted, 
―[w]hereas property interests are created and defined by state law . . . it is 
federal bankruptcy law which determines the outer boundary of what may 
constitute property of the estate pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy 
Code,‖ and that ―federal principles should guide consideration of which 
jurisdiction‘s substantive law applies in cases arising out of federal law.‖84 
There is evidence that federal courts are hostile to offshore self-settled 
asset protection trusts.
85
  For example, in FTC v. Affordable Media, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a federal district court‘s civil contempt order against 
the defendants (the Andersons) for failing to repatriate assets held in a 
Cook Island trust after the plaintiff charged them with fraud.
86
  The Ander-
sons claimed that compliance with the court‘s order was impossible be-
cause the foreign trustee, in accordance with the terms of the trust, refused 
to repatriate trust assets to the United States.
87
  While the court noted that 
―[a] party‘s inability to comply with a judicial order constitute[d] a defense 
to a charge of civil contempt,‖88 it also recognized that the Andersons‘ trust 
document contained an ―anti-duress‖ clause, which divested the Andersons 
of any property interests in the trust property in the event of an adverse 
judgment against them.
89
  In assessing the Andersons‘ impossibility de-
fense, the court found that the Andersons failed to prove impossibility, thus 
  
 81. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.020 (2006). 
 82. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84.  In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 69697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 
 85. See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228, 1238–44 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the district court did not err in holding the defendants in contempt for refusing to repatriate their 
assets in an off-shore trust). 
 86. Id. at 1244. 
 87. Id. at 1239. 
 88. Id. at 1239–40. 
 89.  Id. at 1240 n.9. 
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―leaving for another day the resolution of [the] more difficult question of‖ 
whether ―the Andersons‘ inability to comply with the district court‘s order 
is a defense to a civil contempt charge.‖90  The court seemingly reached 
this conclusion because the Andersons‘ ―impossibility‖ of complying with 
the court‘s repatriation order was self-imposed, and the nature of offshore 
trusts was specifically designed to ―thwart the United States courts.‖91  As 
such, 
the domestic courts will have to be especially chary of accepting a 
defendant‘s assertions that repatriation or other compliance with a 
court‘s order concerning a foreign trust is impossible.  Conse-
quently, the burden on the defendant of proving impossibility as a 




Similarly, in In re Lawrence, the bankruptcy court issued a default 
judgment causing property in Lawrence‘s Mauritian trust to be included in 
his bankruptcy estate.
93
  Mr. Lawrence was an active options trader and 
sustained large margin debts with Bear Stearns after the stock market fall 
on Black Monday, October 19, 1987.
94
  After forty-two months of being 
―mired‖ in arbitration, Mr. Lawrence apparently decided that his prospects 
were not good.
95
  He established a Jersey trust (later moved to Mauritius—
a jurisdiction even more friendly to debtors), in which he deposited be-
tween four and seven million dollars—estimated at ninety percent of his 
net worth.
96
  About three months later, the arbitrator awarded Bear Sterns 
over twenty million dollars.
97
  Mr. Lawrence later filed a voluntary Chapter 
  
 90. Id. at 1240.  Also, it is unclear as to which remedy the court may apply to enforce a civil con-
tempt order when the debtor is asserting an impossibility defense.  Professor Sterk wrote:  
In Affordable Media itself, for instance, the district court ordered the Andersons released 
from custody before the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on their appeal.  Penalties for 
civil contempt are designed to coerce the contemnor into compliance with the court‘s order.  
If incarceration will not induce compliance, the foundation for imprisonment collapses.  
Moreover, a settlor‘s failure to purge his contempt after sitting in jail for months or even 
weeks may establish to a court‘s satisfaction that the settlor is indeed unable to arrange repa-
triation of trust assets, establishing a defense to civil contempt.  Finally, even if a court re-
mains convinced that the settlor has the power to arrange repatriation and that enough incar-
ceration might induce the settlor to repatriate, the court might simply believe that indefinite 
incarceration is inappropriate without express statutory sanction. 
Sterk, supra note 18, at 1039–40 (internal citations omitted). 
 91. FTC v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 227 B.R. 907, 917 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998). 
 94. Sterk, supra note 18, at 1035. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. In re Lawrence, 227 B.R. at 911, 918. 
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7 bankruptcy petition.
98
  He was subsequently jailed for failing to comply 
with the bankruptcy court‘s order to turn over the trust res to the trustee.99 
While the asset-protection features of a New Hampshire DAPT will 
likely extinguish creditors‘ claims—assuming the requirements of the 
UFTA are met—against trust property if the parties and the property are all 
located in New Hampshire,
100
 as discussed above, the effectiveness of 
DAPTs for out-of-state residents and regarding out-of-state property is 
very uncertain.  These trusts appear vulnerable to attack from other juris-
dictions.  It may be reasonable to assume that New Hampshire residents 
may create DAPTs with assets that might have fled the jurisdiction for 
offshore trusts.
101
  But legal uncertainty and the fact that at least nine juris-
dictions have versions of DAPTs make it impossible to conclude that RSA 
564–D will help generate a significant increase in trust business from non-
DAPT states. 
C. Other Advantages of DAPTS 
1. Federal Gift and Estate Tax Benefits 
It may be possible for a transferor to avoid certain estate taxes with a 
DAPT.
102
  Section 2036(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code requires the 
transferor of an inter vivos trust to include the value of transferred assets in 
his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
103
  However, if the transfe-
ror‘s assets are not within the reach of creditors—i.e., if the transferor has 
lost ―dominion and control‖ over the trust corpus—it follows that these 
assets are not in the decedent‘s estate, but represent a completed gift, sub-
ject to gift tax exclusions.
104
  If DAPT assets are regarded by the Internal 
Revenue Service as completed gifts, then a transferor-beneficiary may 
place assets into the DAPT and continue to enjoy the discretionary benefits 
of the assets, while  excluding these assets from his estate—a potentially 
powerful tax planning tool and likely to attract significant out-of-state trust 
business. 
  
 98. Id. at 910. 
 99. Lawrence v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 153 F. App‘x 552, 553 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 100. See generally Grand China, Inc. v. United Nat‘l Ins. Co., 938 A.2d 905 (N.H. 2007) (reinforcing 
New Hampshire‘s judicial deference on matters of public policy to the legislature). 
 101. See John E. Sullivan, III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware 
Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 433 (1998) (―America stands 
virtually alone in its rigid and virtually absolute adherence to the rule against self-settled trusts.‖). 
 102. See 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2006). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293. 
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2. DAPTs in Lieu of Antenuptial Agreements 
An interesting feature of the New Hampshire DAPT is not apparent at 
first glance.  The statute appears to protect spouses and ex-spouses by al-
lowing these ―creditors‖ to enforce judgments such as divisions of property 
or support payments against the assets of a DAPT.
105
  However, this pro-
tection is illusory for post-disposition spouses.  For purposes of the statute, 
―spouse‖ and ―former spouse‖ are defined as ―mean[ing] only persons to 
whom the transferor was married at, or before, the time the qualified dispo-
sition is made.‖106  This distinction may encourage in-state residents to 
establish DAPTs prior to marriage instead of executing antenuptial agree-
ments, thus avoiding their sometimes onerous requirements.
107
 
V.  POLICY ISSUES 
What then are the policy implications?  Even with a tenuous assump-
tion that RSA 564–D will increase New Hampshire‘s trust business, is it 
wise to abandon the traditional rule, still embraced by most jurisdictions, 
that it is against public policy to protect self-settled trust assets from credi-
tors?  Commentators have posited the following arguments against 
DAPTs: 
1)  Spendthrift trusts are immoral.
108
  Professor Haskell‘s ―conclusion [is 
that] that the [t]estator‘s use of the spendthrift provision, and the law which 
upholds it, are not morally defensible.‖109  He reaches this conclusion be-
cause the principles of ―[a]utonomy and duty to family . . . do not permit a 
person to do injury to others.  The impediment to creditors is such an in-
jury.‖110  In characterizing Professor Bogert‘s conclusion that DAPTs are 
per se fraudulent, Professor Adam Hirsch asks: ―[w]hy might an individual 
  
 105. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D:15(I)(a) (2008). 
 106. Id. § 564-D:1(VIII). 
 107. Antenuptial agreements, to prove effective, generally require (among other things) full financial 
disclosure and provisions allowing the prospective spouse the time and opportunity to consult an inde-
pendent attorney.  See Robert Roy, Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Governing Support or 
Property Rights upon Divorce or Separation as Affected by Circumstances Surrounding Execution—
Modern Status, 53 A.L.R. 4th 85, § 3 (1987).  Of course, the prospective spouse must agree.  DAPTs, 
on the other hand, do not require disclosure or consent.  See Roy, supra, at 85, § 1[a]. 
 108. See Paul G. Haskell, Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1025, 
1046–47 (1991) (discussing the moral dilemmas associated with spendthrift trusts). 
 109. Id. at 1047. 
 110. Id. 
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wish to disable herself and her creditors from reaching a portion of her 
property other than to defraud them‖?111 
2)  A debtor should pay his debts.
112
  ―[T]here is something disturbing 
about a country that would allow debtors to leave their debts unpaid and 
still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle.‖113 
3)  DAPTs further erode the traditional liability system
114
: 
Another objection to [DAPTs] is that allowing debtors to use such 
trusts to shelter their assets from potential creditors threatens the 
system of civil enforcement of obligations by undercutting the de-
terrent effect of our liability system and that the better way to ad-




Some argue that DAPTs may distort traditional liability principles by en-
couraging riskier debtor behavior.
116
 
Many of the states that permit spendthrift trusts where the beneficiary 
is not the settlor provide exceptions and allow certain types of creditors to 
enforce claims against a beneficiary by taking assets in the trust.
117
  Pre-
sumably, states that have these exceptions provide them for public policy 
reasons: ―[T]he difficulty comes not so much from the existence of spend-
thrift trusts as from their generally unrestrained extent.‖118  Under New 
Hampshire DAPT law, even valid claims of involuntary creditors such as 
post-disposition tort victims or spouses will be extinguished.
119
 
Of course, some commentators argue in favor of DAPTs.  Besides the 
obvious purpose to attract trust business, other policy considerations favor-
ing DAPTs may include the following: 
  
 111. Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 86 (Spring 1995). 
 112. Nenno, supra note 62, at 272. 
 113. Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
1195, 1259 (2000). 
 114. Nenno & Sullivan, supra note 61, at 811 (―Clients may obtain protection from creditors by 
entering into a variety of other self-settled vehicles. These vehicles include tenancy-by-the-entirety 
property, retirement plans, family limited partnerships (‗FLPs‘) and limited-liability companies 
(‗LLCs‘), homesteads, life insurance policies, annuity contracts, and transfers to or in trust for ‗cooper-
ative‘ friends or family members.‖). 
 115. Id. at 807. 
 116. See Hirsch, supra note 111, at 87 (―[T]hey encourage debtors who have them to take excessive 
credit risks.  Because spendthrift trust beneficiaries have fewer (alienable) assets to lose, they have a 
greater incentive to borrow more.  They can enjoy the upside benefits of borrowing, safe in the know-
ledge that their downside liability remains limited to their out-of-trust assets.‖). 
 117. Id. at 76–78. 
 118. Id. at 72. 
 119. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-D:10, 564-D:15 (2008). 
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1)  If DAPTs are unavailable, beneficiaries who accumulate their own 




2)  Beneficiaries‘ interests other than the settlor are ―ignored.‖121  If credi-
tors are allowed to attack the assets self-settled trusts, beneficiaries who 
were not transferors may lose.  
3)  The U.S. already recognizes the validity of certain types self-settled 
trusts that are immune from most creditors.
122
 




5)  Legally preventing DAPTs interferes with one‘s right of contract and 
free alienation of property.
124
 
This policy debate promises to continue. 
  
 120. Nenno & Sullivan, supra note 61, at 811 (citing Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of 
Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 347(2002)).  
 121. Id. at 809.  But see 3 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT 
AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 15.4.3, at 967–68 n.12 (5th ed. 2007).  The authors state:  
It has also been argued that the Restatement position is ―theoretically unsound,‖ particularly 
insofar as it seems to allow creditors greater access to the assets of a self-settled trust than 
the settlor would have had.  The obvious response is that it is simply not true that the Res-
tatement position allows the settlor‘s creditors greater access than the settlor might have 
had.  The Restatement position allows creditors the same access (but to the maximum ex-
tent) that the settlor might have had.  It may be that the trustee would not always or ever 
have exercised the discretion to the fullest extent in favor of the settlor, but there seem am-
ple justifications for allowing creditors to get what the settlor might have gotten.  Just be-
neath the surface of the Restatement position is the intuition that a significant percentage of 
settlors who create trusts on their own behalf do so in large part to evade creditors.  Given 
how ―asset protection trusts‖ are now marketed this intuition seems plainly accurate.  No 
doubt another component of the thinking behind the Restatement position is the knowledge 
that most settlors (who either are their own trustees or have selected their trustees and re-
tained the right to replace them) have little difficulty obtaining trust distributions, of almost 
any magnitude. 
SCOTT, FRATCHER, & ASCHER, supra, at 967–68 n.12 (internal citation omitted). 
 122. Sullivan, supra note 101, at 428–29 (―[T]he rule against self-settled trusts was not absolute, as 
U.S. law recognized certain exceptions.  The most notable of these exceptions is in the area of pension 
and retirement trusts, such as retirement plans funded pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).‖). 
 123. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 545-A:4, 545-A:5 (2008) (as incorporated by § 564-D:10) (pro-
viding that creditors can assert valid claims, if timely brought, if the purpose of disposition was to 
avoid creditor, or absent intent if brought within four years of disposition). 
 124. Hirsch, supra note 111, at 86.  The author states: 
By creating her own voluntary and involuntary disabling restraints, an individual can de-
prive herself of the opportunity to overspend or overborrow, and thereby shield herself from 
financially destructive impulses that she anticipates having to contend with in the future.  As 
a consequence, she spares herself from eventual regret.  This strategy, known today as pre-
commitment or self-paternalism, is of course the same one that Ulysses followed when he 
lashed himself to the mast of his ship, lest he succumb to the song of the Sirens. 
Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
It will be interesting to observe, over time, how the various states en-
force the creditor protection provisions of out-of-state DAPTs.  Whatever 
the reader‘s position on the virtues of DAPTs—or lack thereof—may be, 
New Hampshire has ―entered the fray,‖ attempting to attract and retain 
trust business.  Because it will be difficult to collect and interpret any mea-
ningful empirical data, assessing the success (or failure) of New Hamp-
shire‘s DAPT statute in achieving its legislative goals of increasing New 
Hampshire‘s trust business is unlikely. 
If, as seems possible, non-DAPT states sometimes disregard DAPT 
choice of law provisions and DAPT states apply full faith and credit to 
non-DAPT state judgments, DAPTs will probably not attract any signifi-
cant out-of-state business.  However, DAPTs may offset this potential 
weakness in attracting out-of-state business by capturing in-state assets that 
may otherwise have traveled to offshore trusts by placing additional bur-
dens on creditors, providing possible tax advantages, and substituting for 
antenuptial agreements.  Nonetheless, the statutory framework in other 
jurisdictions will not remain static.  If other states perceive that they are 
either losing or failing to attract trust business, it seems likely that more 
states will decide to compete by authorizing DAPTs and eliminating the 
RAP, possibly competing away any advantage New Hampshire may offer 
out-of-state settlors. 
Will New Hampshire succeed in attracting and retaining trust business 
by eliminating the long-standing principles against dynastic and self-settled 
spendthrift trusts?  We‘ll likely never know. 
